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Abstract
This paper develops a model of endogenous trade policy formation to study the impact of
preferential trade agreements (PTA) on membersexternal trade policies when members internalize
the intra-bloc welfare e¤ects. This model is empirically tested using global trade data covering 170
countries and 177 PTAs established between 1988 and 2011. This paper nds empirical evidence of
tari¤ cooperation between members of FTAs. Using three di¤erent measures of political relations
(the a¢ nity scores from the UN General Assembly Voting Data, dyad alliances data, and bilateral
events and interactions data), we show that members with good political relation cooperate more
on external tari¤ policy after formation of FTAs. On average, an increase in market share of PTA
partnersrms by one standard deviation is associated with about 3 percentage points increase in
external tari¤ in industries that matter for intra-bloc members.
1 Introduction
Do members in Free Trade Area (FTA) cooperate on their external tari¤ policy? This question is
centric to policy makers who want to understand the welfare implications of FTA for its members. If
FTA members cooperate on the level of their external tari¤s, they would behave similarly to those in
Customs Union (CU), and become more protectionist against outsiders after the formation of the trade
agreement.1 As a result, trade creation within the trade bloc can be plausibly generated at the cost of
trade loss from the outsiders of the bloc. Theoretical literature have shown that FTA leads to further
reduction in trade protection among its members but this result is mainly built on the assumption of
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1See Syropoulos (2002), Facchini et al. (2013), Kennan and Riezman (1990), Bagwell and Staiger (1997), Ornelas
(2005) and Freund and Ornelas (2010).
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non-cooperative policy of FTA members. However, empirically there has been very little known on
this matter.
In this paper, we attempt the empirical study on this matter. To do so, rst we construct a model
of endogenous trade policy formation that incorporates some of the channels, identied in previous
literature, through which FTA can a¤ect the external tari¤s of a FTA member. This base model
provides a testable prediction on how tari¤ complementarity and tari¤ revenue a¤act the choice of
external tari¤ policy for FTA members through terms-of-trade e¤ects. Similar results are found in
Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos (2004), Ornelas (2005b), and Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas
(2008). These results show that FTA induces acceleration on external tari¤ liberalization among its
members, and this result is consistent to the ndings in previous literature about the building block
e¤ect of FTA.
Next, we extend this model by introducing a political factor that allows us to capture and di¤er-
entiate the motive for tari¤ cooperation between FTA members. FTA members will internalize the
e¤ect of their external tari¤ policy on their partners welfare if they are concerned about each oth-
ers. The internalization takes the form of jointly optimization of external tari¤ by incorporating the
partners welfare function into each others objective functions. We allow heterogeneity in the degree
of internalization which is weighted by this political factor. We use political relation between FTA
partners as the measure for this political factor. This political feature of the model shows that FTA
members coordinate more on external tari¤ setting when their political relations are closer. It also
implies that when a FTA is formed by close political partners, their external trade policy tends to be
more protectionist as what we would expect to nd among CU members.
To test for tari¤ cooperation among FTA members, we formulate our empirical specication based
on the predictions of the equilibrium external tari¤ policy from the structural model. From the
theoretical model, we derive two equilibrium policies: (i) equilibrium external tari¤ policy under
non-cooperative setup; (ii) equilibrium external tari¤ policy under cooperative setup. We derive the
di¤erence in external tari¤policy from the equilibrium under these two setups and specify our empirical
strategy to test the di¤erence as the e¤ect of tari¤ cooperation on external tari¤.
The data we use for this project come from several sources. Data on tari¤ cover 170 di¤erent
countries for the period from 1988 to 2011 at HS 6-digit level. During this time period, a total of
177 free trade agreements have been established. Industrial data in manufacturing sector covering
these countries during the periods are at ISIC 3-digit level. To approximate political relations between
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countries we employ three measures: (i) the a¢ nity scores from the UN General Assembly Voting
Data; (ii) the formal alliance status from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance data; and (iii) bilateral
political events and interactions from the Conict and Peace Data Bank.2
We then estimate our empirical specication using the data. Our results provide strong evidence
for tari¤ cooperation among the FTA formed during the period from 1988 to 2011. On average, the
external tari¤s on the rent-generating industries for FTA partners liberalize 20% slower compared to
other industries. The results also show that political relation plays an important role in determining
FTA partners external tari¤ policy. Comparing to the results without the political factor as the
benchmark, we nd an addition of 8% slower liberalization in external tari¤s on the rent-generating
industries among the FTA partners who share similar economic and political interests, and an addition
of 20% slower liberalization among those who have formal alliance with military defense treaty.
Our work is related to the strand of literature on the impact of regionalism on multilateralism.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Stoyanov (2009), RTA weakens the motivation for tari¤
protection by creating leakage in this protectionist trade policy so that reduces the incentive for special
politically active group lobbying for protection. Levy (1997) shows that bilateral trade agreement may
disproportionally benets the countriesmedian voters, thus increasing the support against protection
liberalization. Krishna (1998) suggests that if RTA creates large gains to some powerful economic
groups, reduction is external protection becomes politically infeasible.
Our work is also related to the studies on incentives to alter external tari¤s in RTAs. Kennan and
Riezman (1990) show that in a three-country general equilibrium endowment economy, equilibrium
external tari¤s are higher when countries moving from FTA to CU. Richardson (1993) nds that FTA
members tend to lower external tari¤s to mitigate the negative impact from trade diversion generated
by RTA. Bagwell and Staiger (1997), Freund (2000), Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos (2004), Ornelas
(2005a, 2005b), and Saggi and Yildiz (2010) illustrate how FTA induces incentive for multilateral trade
through terms-of-trade e¤ect.
Our paper is also related to Limao (2007)s study. He looks at tari¤ cooperation of FTA partners
in non-trade issues. Preferential treatment is o¤ered to RTA partners in exchange for cooperation
on, for example, drug trade issues. A reduction on external tari¤ protection would diminish the benet
the RTA partners from this preferential treatment, so that it could erode the incentive for the partners
to maintain their cooperation on non-trade issues. This paper is closely related to Mai and Stoyanov
2Detail descriptions of the data can be found in Section 4.
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(2015)s study, which analyses the e¤ect of CUSFTA on Canadian external trade policy. In this study,
they categorize Canadian industries in quartiles ranked by the rent generated to US, and they nd
that the industries which create the least rent to US have exhibited fastest liberalization in external
tari¤s.
The paper is organized as the follows. In the next section, we present the model of endogenous
trade policy formation and derive the equilibrium external tari¤ policy under tari¤ cooperation. In
Section 3, we present the empirical specication and the interpretations of the key variables. In Section
4, we discuss the data used for this project. In Section 5, we present the empirical results and the
discussion of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Theory
In this section, we study the channels through which di¤erent degrees of political relation can a¤ect
a countrys choice on its external tari¤s. We present a monopolistic competition model with di¤er-
entiated products and free market entry, and derive the equilibrium trade policy for a country which
faces heterogeneous political a¢ nity to her partners with preferential trade agreements (PTA). The
theoritical model will lay foundations for our empirical specications.
To identify tari¤ cooperation within a FTA, our strategy is to incorporate a measurement for
political relations among FTA partners as the weights for the importance of the partnersnational
welfares that are taken into consideration into governments decision of the formation of its external
trade policy. Then derive and compare the equilibrium trade policy with and without tari¤ cooperation.
Consider a model with a Home country, H, trading with R partner countries with PTA and F
countries without PTA, hereafter indexed by H, f and r respectively. Note that f = 1; :::; F and
r = 1; :::; R, and country j 2 fH; f; rg. All countries produce and trade N + 1 goods, with the rst
good being a numeraire, traded at no costs and produced by perfectly competitive rms. For all other
industry i the number of rms in each country j is xed and equal to nij , and each rm produces
a distinct variety of a good. All rms in industry i are assumed to be symmetric within country j,
therefore they share the same demand function, production technology and charge the same price.
There are (niH +
PF
f=1 nif +
PR
r=1 nir) varieties in industry i available to consumers in country H for
H 6= f and H 6= r.
Suppose that the preferences of a representative agent in country j can be denoted by a quasilinear
4
utility function with a constant elasticity of substitution for varieties in industry i
U = X0 +
nX
i=1
i lnXi;
nX
i=1
ai = 1 (1)
where i is the fraction of total expenditure the agent spends on industry i goods. X0 is consumption
of the numeraire good. Xi is the sub-utility derived from the consumption of di¤erentiated product
i produced at home and abroad, and assumed to take the non-symmetric CES form, which can be
represented by
Xi =
0@niHd 1iiHxi 1iiH + RX
r=1
nird
1
i
ir x
i 1
i
ir +
FX
f=1
nifjd
1
i
if x
i 1
i
if
1A
i
i 1
(2)
where i > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of good i, dij denotes the taste parameter
for i from country j, and xij is the demand for i produced in country j. Maximizing equation (1)
subject to standard budget constraint, we obtain the demand function and aggregate price index for
the di¤erentiated product i:
xij = aidijp
 i
ij P
i 1
i 8 j 2 fH; f; rg (3)
Pi =
0@niHdiHp1 iiH + RX
r=1
nirdirp
1 i
ir +
FX
f=1
nifdifp
1 i
if
1A 11 i : (4)
Home country government sets two types of ad valorem tari¤s - preferential tari¤,  ir, on imports from
country r and MFN tari¤,  if , on imports from country f . The prot function facing di¤erent rms
in Home country can be written as:
iH = (piH   ciH) qiH (5)
ij = ((1   ij)pij   cij) qij 8 j 2 ff; rg
where qij is the quantity supplied and cij is the marginal costs of production. Assuming the number
of rms is large enough that an individual rms decision on pricing has no impact on the aggregate
price index Pi, each rm takes the price index as given. Knowing the demand function, each rm
5
maximizes prot by setting its price:
piH =

i
i   1

ciH , pij =
i
(i   1)
1
(1   ij)cij 8 j 2 ff; rg (6)
where  ij is the ad valorem tari¤ collected by the Home country government. Each rm sets its price
by a mark-up over its marginal cost. Substituting equation (6) into (5), the prot functions can be
written in a convenient form:
iH = 
 1
i piHxiH (7)
ij = (1   ij) 1i pijqij 8 j 2 ff; rg:
The next step towards deriving the optimal trade policy on external tari¤ is to set up governments
objective function. One issue is that we do not know the form of the objective function. Participation
in any trade agreement is afterall a political decision therefore this function can take various forms
depending on the objectives of governments.3 For now, we assume that governmentsobjectives are
socially desirable for their domestic welfare. Let the objective function, G, consist of the sum of
consumer surplus from consumption of di¤erentiated goods (CS), tari¤ revenue (TR), and prots of
domestic rms (iH):
G = CS( ij) + TR( ij) +
nX
i=1
niHiH( ij) (8)
where
CS( ij) = U(X0; Xi;  ij) 
nX
i=1
H;F;RX
j=1
pijnijxij ; (9)
and
TR() =
nX
i=1
F;RX
j=1
 ijnijxij : (10)
2.1 Tari¤ cooperation in FTA
One distinction between members of FTA and CU is that FTA members maintain autonomous external
tari¤ policies while CU members jointly set and share common external tari¤s. This subtle di¤erence
creates the tendency for members of CUs to coordinate and adopt higher external tari¤s than those of
3Grossman and Helpman (1994), (1995), Krishna (1998), and Stoyanov (2009) show that special interest groups
inuence governments objectives. Limao (2007) shows that RTAs can be used by governments as motives to induce
partner country to cooperate in non-trade areas.
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FTAs.4 Tari¤ coordinations among CUs have been criticized because they could hinder the viability
of multilateral free trade. However, it is not yet clear whether tari¤ coordination exists among FTAs
because government can adjust external tari¤ rates to accommodate the impact from the changes in
preferential policy and reassure its objectives.5
Next, we look at the case when a government of FTA members is concerned about the welfare of
other members of the FTA, it incorporates the welfare of other members into its objective function
(8), it becomes:
G = CS( if ) + TR( if ) +
nX
i=1
niHiH( if ) +
RX
rj=1
rWr; (11)
where Wr is the welfare of partner country r and r 2 [0; 1] measures the degree of concern country H
to Wr. Since the external policy of H will a¤ect the prots of exporting rms of r in H and not a¤ect
the consumer surplus and tari¤ revenue of partner r, we can simplify expression (11) as the following:
G = CS( if ) + TR( if ) +
nX
i=1
niHiH( if ) +
nX
i=1
RX
r=1
rnirir( if ); (12)
where nirir is the total prots of rms from partner r in industry i inH. Government ofH internalizes
the prots of rms from partner r (essentially partners welfare) into consideration when optimizing its
objective function, and the larger is r the higher degree of internalization takes place for its partner
rs welfare in Hs objective function. By choosing the level of external tari¤ rate  if , H maximizes its
object in (12), and after collecting terms, we obtain the following equilibrium external tari¤ policy:
fi  if =
i   1
i
siH + (i   1)
RX
r=1
 irsir +
i   1
i
RX
r=1
r (1   ir) sir (13)
where siH =
nirpirxir
ai
is the market share of domestic rms in industry i and sir =
nirpirxir
ai
is market
share of rms in industry i from partner country r in H. On the left hand side of equation (13) is
external tari¤ rate  if multiplied by 
f
i , which is the import demand elasticity for goods i imported
from outsiders. In (13), siH and sir are positively related to external tari¤  if . The positive relation
between siH and  if suggests that if the market share of domestic rms in industry i is low after
the formation of FTA, it is optimal to have a low external tari¤ rate for i. One explanation for this
4See Kennan and Riezman (1990) and Facchini et al. (2013) among others for rationales for higher external tari¤s
under CUs. Estevadeordal et al. (2008) nd tari¤ complementarity only in FTAs.
5See for example of optimal external tari¤s settings Kennan and Riezman (1990), Richardson (1993), Yi (1996),
Bagwell and Staiger (1999), Cadot et al. (1999), Freund (2000) and more recently Ornelas (2005a, 2005b), (2007),
Facchini et al. (2009).
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positive relation is the protection leakage e¤ect. If siH is small in H, protection from high  if will
be an ine¢ cient rent-generator for domestic rms, instead, part of the rents would go to the partners
rms. Because protection for rents to domestic rms becomes less e¤ective when siH is small, H would
be better o¤ to shift some of the rents from FTA partners back to CS by lowering  if .
The second term in (13) reects the e¤ect of tari¤ complementarity such as in Richardson (1993).
If preferential tari¤s are low - large preferential margins, it is optimal for government to lower the
corresponding external tari¤s. The complementary e¤ect is stronger with larger market share of
partner rms and closer substitude of product i. Intuitively, a drop in intra-bloc tari¤ induces a shift
of imports from outsiders, who have comparative advantage in production of i, to less e¢ cient partner
r thanks to preferential tari¤ treatment. Thus, the trade diversion reduces overall welfare. To mitigate
the welfare lost from the distortion of trade pattern, governments can lower external tari¤s to redirect
some of the imports back to their original sources.6
The last term in (13) indicates the e¤ect from tari¤ cooperation. The positive relation between
 if and sir suggests that, if H is concerned about partner rs welfare, it is optimal to coordinate with
high external tari¤ for industry i if the market shares of rms from partner r in industry i is large
after the formation of FTA. The intensity for tari¤ cooperation is strong if r is high. Reducing the
external tari¤ in i would induce competition coming from external rms and thus reduce the rents of
the partners rms.
For the case when r = 0, it implies no tari¤ cooperation between FTA members. The welfare
function of FTA partner Wr in (11) does not enter the objective function of H government. In such
case, the external tari¤ policy in equlibrium becomes
iROW  iROW =
i   1
i
siH + (i   1)
RX
r=1
 irsir: (14)
3 Empirical specication
Policy response often may not be instantaneous. To allow for policy response delays, we introduce time
dimension to both (13) and (14). Next, we move to estimate tari¤ cooperation among FTA partners.
First, suppose H and r form a trade agreement at time t. If H coordinates its external tari¤ for r into
6Other researchers also provide di¤erent explanations for tari¤ complementarity, for example Bagwell and Staiger
(1999) in terms of trade motivations; Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Ornelas (2005a) in political economy factors;
Saggi and Yildiz (2010) in endowment models with endogenous trade agreements.
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period t+ 1, from (13), we have
fi  if;t+1 =
i   1
i
siH;t+1 + (i   1)
RX
r=1
 ir;t+1sir;t+1 +
i   1
i
RX
r=1
r (1   ir;t+1) sir;t+1: (15)
Comparing (15) to the equilibrium external tari¤ policy represent by (14) in period t, and time di¤er-
encing gives us the following:
fi1
f
i;t =
i   1
i
1siH;t + (i   1)
RX
r=1
1 ir;tsir;t +
i   1
i
RX
r=1
r (1   ir;t) sir;t (16)
where 1 represent time di¤erence by 1 period. Note that the last term on the right hand side of (16)
is the market share from r in level, for which, one interpretation can be that it captures the importance
of industry i to partner r.
Equation (16) outlines the two forces driving external tari¤s in opposite directions - tari¤ comple-
mentarity and tari¤ coordination. With our main goal focused on testing tari¤ coordination among
FTAs, and motivated by (16), our empirical framework is the following:
i
i   1
f
i1
f
i;t = 0 + 11siH;t + 2
RX
r=1
1 ir;tsir;t + 3
RX
r=1
r;t (1   ir;t) sir;t + i;t (17)
where sir;t is measured by the value of imports of good i from partner r over the total domestic
spending on i at time t and siH;t is the domestic output over the total domestic spending on i at
t. Equation (17) assembles the relationship between external tari¤ and the key explanatory variables
from the model into an econometric form. Note that for the FTAs where  ir;t immediately reduce
to zero, for following years  ir;t become zero. In such case, the term
PR
rj=1
 irj ;tsirj ;t disappears
and
PR
rj=1
rj;t
 
1   irj ;t

sirj ;t becomes
PR
rj=1
rj;tsirj ;t. In previous literature, the role of political
a¢ nity is often overlooked when investigating the relationships between preferential tari¤ and MFN
tari¤ for industries traded with FTA partners and outsiders.7 The e¤ects of preferential tari¤ from
di¤erent FTA partners on MFN tari¤ are treated homogeneously. However, relations of countries
are heterogeneous and thus there is a strong reason to believe the e¤ect of tari¤ cooperation on
external tari¤ must be di¤erent by country if political relationship between partner countries matters
when a country sets up its external policies. One novelty of this study is that we estimate the e¤ect
7For example, Limaos (2006) approach is to assign a dummy variable that equals one for industries US imports
from its PTA partner and compare the change in MFN tari¤s in these industries to those that do not import from PTA
partners post- and pre- Uruguay Round.
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of preferential tari¤ on external tari¤s under a political economic perspective by di¤erentiating the
importance of FTA partnerswelfare to government H so that the impact on its external policy is
weighted di¤erently by how close the political relations are its partners. In equation (17), r is a
partner country specic political parameter that weights the importance of the market shares from r
in H. The idea is that, if partner country r is politically close to H, r is high and share of partner
rms sir;t matters more in the relation to 
f
i;t ceteris paribus, we would expect a more signicant of
3 in the estimation of (17).
To test whether or not political relation r matters for tari¤ cooperation, we estimate two sets of
results on (17) - one treating all r homogeneously (e.g. r = 1 for all r), and another allowing r to vary.
Consider four scenarios - a pair FTA partners can have high or low r pre- or post- FTA formation.
Figure 1 illustrates the level of MFN tari¤ of H for non-members before and after the formation of
FTA. External tari¤, fi;t, on country f is at 
f
i;t0
(Lrj;t0 ; 
H
rj;t0
) from time t0. Suppose H and r forms a
FTA at time t1, the external tari¤ on f can either go up or down or remain unchanged.8 The average
MFN tari¤ rate is 9:6% for the period from 1988 to 2011, and have decreased by 0:35% per year. Figure
1 shows this general downward trend of global MFN tari¤s. The idea is that if Home and country rj are
close political partners, Home is concerned about rjs welfare and adopts a more protective external
policy after the formation of FTA. In such case, f is higher than it would otherwise be in post PTA
period t1. For the country pair, political a¢ nity set (
H
rj;t0
; Hrj;t1 ) and (
L
rj;t0
; Hrj;t1), 
f
i;t+1 will be at

fHigh
i;t1
. External tari¤ is lower at fLowi;t1 for (
H
rj;t0
; Lrj;t1) and (
L
rj;t0
; Lrj;t1). The di¤erence between

fHigh
i;t1
and fLowi;t1 is the stumbling e¤ect on external liberalization coming from tari¤ cooperation based
on their level of political a¢ nity rj;t . More importantly, a statistically signicant rj;t would provide
a possible answer to the puzzle why some nd stumbling block e¤ect in FTAs while others nd building
block e¤ect.
If tari¤ cooperation exists, we would be more likely to nd it in industries that import under PTA.
We expect there is no tari¤ cooperation for industries that have no imports from PTA partners because
the higher external tari¤ rate does not increase the prots of partner countriesrms, and it is not in
the interest of the Home government too. We expect the e¤ect of cooperation will be stronger if the
size of market share of partnersrms in i is large.9 The the e¤ect of PTA on external tari¤ would
8WTO member conutries have legally bound commitments on tari¤ rates, which act as the ceilings on tari¤s. Gov-
ernments can adjust tari¤ rates upward only if the applied rates are lower than the bound rates.
9Using import share of PTA partner rms in Home may not be the best way to measure the importance of industry i
to partner country as some suggest the importance of industry i in Home for PTA partner country should be measured
by the export share of i in partner country to Home. However, we argue this is a reasonable measure for capturing tari¤
cooperation because if Home is concerned about welfare of partner country, it cares the most for large industries in the
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probably be undermined because the dummy variable forgoes the size e¤ect.
The key variable of interest is
PR
r=1 r;t (1   ir;t) sir;t because we are interested to know how fi;t
responds in industries that are benecial to r. For capturing the potential further delays in policy
responds, we include 6 more lag periods of
PR
r=1 r;t (1   ir;t) sir;t in (17). Changes in preferential
policy will force partnersrms to adjust their production and management, and the process likely take
time. Any changes in Homes market conditions coming from the impact of partnersrmsadjustments
are more likely to emerge in later periods. We expect governments response through external policy
to any market condition changes will not happen simultaneously so we lag all explanatory variables to
one period time. After implementing the lag periods, the estimation equation becomes
Yi;t = 0 + 1X
1
i;t 1 + 2X
2
i;t 1 + 3X
3
i;t 1 + 4X
3
i;t 2 + :::+ 8X
3
i;t 6 + i;t (18)
where Yi;t = ii 1
f
i1
f
i;t,X
1
i;t 1 = 1siH;t = siH;t siH;t 1,X2i;t 1 =
PR
r=1  ir;tsir;t 
PR
r=1  ir;t 1sir;t 1,
X3i;t 1 =
PR
r=1 r;t 1 (1   ir;t 1) sir;t 1 and X3i;t 2 =
PR
r=1 r;t 2 (1   ir;t 2) sir;t 2. Also note that
time di¤erence in equation (18) can also help remove any country-industry xed e¤ects.
3.1 Estimation issues
Endogeneity is a serious concern when estimating the e¤ect of market share on external tari¤ policy
because the level of external tari¤ can reversely a¤ect the market shares of both domestic and for-
eign rms. Since we are interested in establishing the causal relationship, a good instrument for the
market shares of PTA partners in Home becomes very important. To do this we construct an instru-
ment variable for traded goods from PTA partners following the methodology detailed in Frankel and
Romer (1999). We predict trade ows between countries using geographic characteristics from gravity
equation. This is a valid approach because trade ows between countries are highly correlated to their
geographical characteristics, which are unlikely correlated to any trade policies. We regress the values
of imports in log for every industry i on dyadic gravity variables. We perform the following:
ln(Mij) = a0 + a1 lnDij + a2 lnNi + a3 lnNj + a4 lnAi + a5 lnAj (19)
+a6 (Li + Lj) + a7B + a8B lnDij + a9B lnAi + a10B lnAj
+a11B lnNi + a12B lnNj + a14B (Li + Lj) :
Home market.
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In equation (19), Dij is the distance between country i and j, Ni and Ai are the population and
area in country i repectively, and Li indicates whether country i is landlocked. The tted values of
equation (19) are used as our instrument variable (IV ) for imports of Home i from partner rj , denoted
by import_iv1 in Table 1. We construct three additional IV to ensure results will be not sensitive
to the way we construct the IV . For the second IV , we extend equation (19) to include controling
for high dimensional country-year xed e¤ects for country i and j following the estimation procedure
in Martyn et al. (2006). The tted values are denoted by import_iv2 in Table 1. The third IV and
the fourth IV , include controls for industry-year xed e¤ects and country-industry-year xed e¤ects
respectively and are denoted by import_iv3 and import_iv4.
4 Data
This paper uses data from several di¤erent sources. Tari¤ data comes from UN Comtrade Database,
covering 177 free trade agreements involved 170 di¤erent countries for the time period from 1988 to
2011, available at the 6-digit HS classication level. Tari¤ rates are aggregated to ISIC 3-digit level
based on Product Concordance from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). The data on output,
imports, exports and import demand elasticities fi are obtained from Nicita, and Olarreaga (2006).
Domestic share, siH;t, is constructed by the value of domestic output in industry i over the total
domestic spending on i. Similarly, the share of PTA partner, sirj ;t, is the ratio of the value of imports
from partner rj to domestic spending in i. The missing values in output data is imputed with the
tted value from regressing output data to industry index. The data on elasticity of substitution,
i, is obtained from Broda and Weinstein (2006) at ISIC 3-digit level. The data on geographical
characteristics is from Mayer and Zignago (2011). Gravity equation variables come from Head and
Mayer (2013).
We employ several approaches to measure bilateral political relation rj;t . For our rst measure,
we use the a¢ nity score index constructed by Voeten (2013) based on the United Nations General
Assembly Voting Data (UNGAVD). The data records voting information on General Assembly res-
olutions for each UN member country. UN members can approve, abstain, or disapprove of each
resolution. Based on the voting data, the dyadic a¢ nity scores is constructed as the share of similar
votes between country i and country j over the total of country is votes. The a¢ nity score index is
often used to measure the degree of similarity in the economic and geopolitical interests of a pair of
countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). For example, the average magnitude of the a¢ nity score index
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for US and its major political allies (Canada, France, Israel, UK, and Australia) ranges from 0:58 to
0:86 for the period between 2000 and 2012, and the score ranges from 0:17 to 0:21 for countries such
as Iraq, Afghanistan, Cuba, Indonesia, and China during these periods.
Common political interests between countries is an important indicator of good international re-
lations, yet not a perfect one. As Voeten (2013) points out, some countries may have share similar
voting patterns in the UN on global matters but have poor political relations (e.g. India and Pakistan).
Therefore, it is necessary to have additional political relation proxies to complement UN a¢ nity scores.
Our second measure of political relations is the formal alliance status between two countries. We
retrieve alliances data from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance (COWFA) v4.1 data set rst con-
structed by Small and Singer (1969) and maintained by Gibler and Press (2009). This dataset covers
the periods from 1835 to 2012. The COWFA divides country is alliances into 3 categories - defense
pact, neutrality (non-aggression) treaty, and entente agreement. We use an indicator variable to clas-
sify countries are in good political relation if there is defense pact, which is the highest level of military
commitment among these three classes and it requires intense political cooperation.
For the third measure of political relations, we use the frequencies of bilateral events and interactions
from the Conict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), which records actions of approximately 135
countries toward one another on a daily basis. The majority of the international events that involve
countries are related to political relations (37:6%), economoic relations (27:5%), military and strategic
relations (14:9%), and cultural and scientic relations (10%). The bilateral interactions are categorized
as cooperative, neutural or uncooperative. The events are recorded for the period from 1948 to 1978, a
bit over 20 years prior to the rst year of our data set, and the relevance of these events for the current
political relations is certainly a concern. However, we argue that the international relations between
countries have remained relatively stable since the end of the Second World War and the frequency
of diplomatic interactions from 1950s to 1970s can still be informative of the current international
relations.10
In order to isolate the role of political relations from other inuences to the frequency of bilateral
events, such as the relative size of two countries, we rst regress the number of diplomatic cooperative
interactions on the log of population, GDP, geographic area, and the log of distance from one another
using the full sample of country-pairs.11 Because the dependent variable is a count variable with a
10This may not be the case for relationship with countries from the former Soviet Block, so we excluded them from
this analysis.
11These variables are retrieved from Research and Expertise on the World Economy (CEPII).
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large dispersion, the model is estimated by negative binomial regression with country-year xed e¤ects.
We use the residuals from the regression as our measure of political relations, which is essentially the
frequency of bilateral events purged from the scale e¤ect. Figure 2 plots political interactions index
against the a¢ nity scores for US and other countries in our sample. It reveals that the frequency of
diplomatic interactions is positively correlated with a¢ nity scores, suggesting that the two measures
capture similar aspects of political relations.
Table 1 summarizes the variables of interests in this study. The average MFN tari¤ in our sample
is 7.3% during the period from 1988 to 2011. The average reduction of MFN tari¤ is about 0.4% each
year during this period. The shares of domestic output over domestic consumptions are just over 60%
and shrinks at about 1% per year on average for countries in our sample. The political relation proxies
from UN a¢ nity scores, defense pack, political interactions are summarized in UN , Defense, and
Interaction respectively.
5 Results
In this section, we will provide results from estimating specication (18) and discuss their economic
implications.
First, we want to learn whether in general countries are concerned with the welfare of their PTA
partners. One way is to test if countries o¤er protectionist trade policy to umbrella the industries that
are important to their PTA partners. We begin with estimating specication (18) without including
any political relation proxy. This estimation shows how external tari¤ of each country H responds
in the industries which have presence from their PTA partnersrms. If there is tari¤ coordination
between PTA members, we would expect external tari¤s to be relatively higher in these industries or
they are liberalized slower than they would otherwise be. Linear regression results are provided in
Table 2. Column (1) reports the result on how changes in external tari¤ respond in industries with
market presence of partnersrms for lagged 6 periods. Results in column (2) and column (3) are
adjusted by elasticity of substitution and import demand elasticity respectively. Results in column
(4) are adjusted by both types of elasticity. All these results are controlled for country-industry xed
e¤ects. Results in Table 2 show that there are positive associations between changes in external tari¤s
and market presence of PTA partner countriesrms. The e¤ects are stronger in the 2nd and the 3rd
lagged periods with coe¢ cients statistically signicant at 0:01. The results suggest that an increase in
market share of PTA partnersrms by one standard deviation is associated with about 3 percentage
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points increase in external tari¤ in industry i for the 3rd period after formation of PTA.
We report the panel structure regression results from estimating specication (18) with di¤erent
political relation proxies in Table 3. Column (1) provides the results unweight by any political relation
measures as the benchmark. For estimation results in Column (2) to (4), the market share from
PTA partnersrms are weighted by political relation proxies. For example, when sirj ;t is weighted by
defense treaty Defense;r (in Column 3), it estimates the e¤ect of those industries imports from country
Hs political alliances. The estimation results relaxing the elasticity are reported in column (5) - (8).
If close political relation between countries induces higher co-operation on external trade policy, we
would expect the e¤ect of weighted sirj ;t on changes in external tari¤ to be stronger. Comparing to the
benchmark results in Column (1), we nd results weighted by political relation proxies are stronger
especially for the 2nd and 3rd periods into PTA. For example, results in Column (2) suggests that
those industries with rms from PTA partner countries which share similar geopolitical and economic
interests enjoy about 50% more tari¤ protection at 3rd year into PTA. We nd similar e¤ects when
sirj ;t is weighted by Defense;r and Interaction;r.
Next, we report the IV estimation results for Imports from PTA partners. First, we estimate
the benchmark model using unweight sirj ;t and which is instrumented by four di¤erent IV s which
discussed in the previous section. Results are reported inTable 4 Column (1) - (4). Column (5) - (8)
report the estimation results excluding the elasticity. In Table 5, we show the IV estimation results
for specication (18) using three political relation proxies. The results from IV estimators are robust
and consistent to the previous ndings.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an endogenous trade policy formation model in a monopolistic competition
framework with di¤erentiated products and free market entry. We derive the equilibrium trade policy
that incorporates a political factor to captures tari¤ cooperation between FTA member countries.
Using this model, we show that multilateral liberalization is slower if FTA partners are concerned
about the welfare of other members when setting their external trade policy.
We test this the prediction of the model using comprehensive trade and industry data, and nd
evidence that supports the tari¤ cooperative hypothesis. In addition, we nd that the closer are the
two FTA partners in political relations the more likely these two members coordinate their external
trade policy to benet the national welfare of the other.
15
References
Alesina, A., and D. Dollar (2000): Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?, Journal of
Economic Growth, 5(1), 3363.
Andrews, M., T. Schank, and R. Upward (2006): Practical Fixed-E¤ects Estimation Methods
for the Three-Way Error Components Model,Stata Journal, 6(4), 461.
Bagwell, K., and R. W. Staiger (1997): Multilateral Tari¤ Cooperation during the Formation
of Free Trade Areas,International Economic Review, 38(2), pp. 291319.
Bond, E. W., R. G. Riezman, and C. Syropoulos (2004): A Strategic and Welfare Theoretic
Analysis of Free Trade Areas,Journal of International Economics, 64(1), 127.
Broda, C., J. Greenfield, and D. Weinstein (2006): From Groundnuts to Globalization: A
Structural Estimate of Trade and Growth, Discussion paper, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Cadot, O., J. De Melo, and M. Olarreaga (1999): Regional Integration and Lobbying for
Tari¤s Against Nonmembers,International Economic Review, 40(3), 635658.
Estevadeordal, A., C. Freund, and E. Ornelas (2008): Does Regionalism A¤ect Trade Liber-
alization Toward Nonmembers?,The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(4), 15311575.
Facchini, G., P. Silva, and G. Willmann (2013): The Customs Union issue: Why do we observe
so few of them?,Journal of International Economics, 90(1), 136147.
Feenstra, R. C. (1994): New Product Varieties and the Measurement of International Prices,
American Economic Review, pp. 157177.
Frankel, J. A., and D. Romer (1999): Does Trade Cause Growth?,American Economic Review,
pp. 379399.
Freund, C. (2000): Multilateralism and the Endogenous Formation of Preferential Trade Agree-
ments,Journal of International Economics, 52(2), 359 376.
Freund, C., and E. Ornelas (2010): Regional trade agreements,Annu. Rev. Econ., 2(1), 139166.
Gibler, D. M., and C. Press (2009): International Military Alliances, 1648-2008. CQ Press Wash-
ington, DC.
16
Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman (1994): Protection for Sale,American Economic Review,
84(4), 83350.
(1995): The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements,American Economic Review, 85(4), 66790.
Head, K., and T. Mayer (2013): Gravity Equations: Workhorse, Toolkit, and Cookbook,Hand-
book of International Economics, 4, 131196.
Kennan, J., and R. Riezman (1990): Optimal Tari¤ Equilibria with Customs Unions,Canadian
Journal of Economics, pp. 7083.
Krishna, P. (1998): Regionalism And Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach,The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 113(1), 227250.
Levy, P. I. (1997): A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements,American Economic
Review, pp. 506519.
Limao, N. (2007): Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block
for Multilateral Liberalization?,Review of Economic Studies, 74, 821855.
Mai, J., and A. Stoyanov (2015): The e¤ect of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement on Canadian
Multilateral Trade Liberalization,Canadian Journal of Economics, 48(3).
Mayer, T., and S. Zignago (2011): Notes on CEPIIs Distances Measures: The GeoDist Data-
base,Working Papers 2011-25, CEPII.
Nicita, A., and M. Olarreaga (2007): Trade, Production, and Protection Database, 19762004,
The World Bank Economic Review, 21(1), 165171.
Ornelas, E. (2005a): Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System,
Journal of International Economics, 67(2), 471497.
(2005b): Trade Creating Free Trade Areas and the Undermining of Multilateralism,Euro-
pean Economic Review, 49(7), 1717 1735.
(2007): Exchanging Market Access at the OutsidersExpense: the Case of Customs Unions,
Canadian Journal of Economics, 40(1), 207224.
Richardson, M. (1993): Endogenous Protection and Trade Diversion, Journal of International
Economics, 34(3-4), 309324.
17
Saggi, K., and H. M. Yildiz (2010): Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Quest for Global Free
Trade,Journal of International Economics, 81(1), 2637.
Small, M., and J. D. Singer (1969): Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the Basic
Data,Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 257282.
Stoyanov, A. (2009): Trade Policy of A Free Trade Agreement in the Presence of Foreign Lobbying,
Journal of International Economics, 77(1), 3749.
Syropoulos, C. (2002): On Tari¤ Preferences and Delegation Decisions in Customs Union: a
Heckscher-Ohline Approach,The Economic Journal, 112(481), 625648.
Voeten, E. (2013): Data and Analyses of Voting in the United Nations General Assembly,Routledge
Handbook of International Organization. London: Routledge, pp. 5466.
Yi, S.-S. (1996): Endogenous Formation of Customs Unions Under Imperfect Competition: Open
Regionalism is Good,Journal of International Economics, 41(1), 153177.
18
7 Appendix
Some of the derivations:
The response of price and quantity to change in the tari¤ rate:
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Import demand elasticity:
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Table 1. Summary statistics of variables of interest.
Variable Description Mean
Standard 
deviation Min Max N
τ ROW MFN tariff .073 .161 0 25.662 84429
Δ t-1 τ
ROW Change in MFN tariff -.004 .183 -2.586 13.834 77430
τ PTA Preferential tariff .001 .011 0 1.958 84429
Δ t-1 τ
PTA Change in preferential tariff 0 .015 -1.958 1.901 77430
ε ij Import demand elasticity 7.2 40.471 1.042 2944.918 63015
σ ij elasticity of substitution -1.093 1.066 -38.681 -.003 50835
S iH,t Home industry share .633 .297 0 1 12068
Δ t-1 S iH Change in Home industry share -.007 .093 -.971 .895 10469
S ir,t Partner industry market share .002 .028 0 .973 15458
Δ t-1 S ir,t Change in partner industry share 0 .039 -.954 .973 13043
ln(import) log of imports 5.651 3.187 0 18.956 2374356
ln(import_IV 1 ) log of imports (instrument 1) 5.172 1.748 .002 16.705 1525623
ln(import_IV 2 ) log of imports (instrument 2) 5.403 2.715 0 22.337 2173609
ln(import_IV 3 ) log of imports (instrument 3) 5.405 2.714 0 22.345 2173609
ln(import_IV 4 ) log of imports (instrument 4) 5.43 2.675 0 20.023 1525623
ф UN UN affinity index .834 .151 0 1 387840
ф Defense Defense treaty indicator .793 .405 0 1 60349
ф Interaction Countries interactions index -.2 .533 -1 6.06 11151
Note: τ ROW and τ PTA are MFN tariff and preferential tariff respectively, aggregated from 6-digit HS classification to 3-
digit ISIC classification. S ir,t is the ratio of output to domestic consumption of i . Imports are recorded at 6-digit HS
classification. The correlations between imports and its instrument variables import_IV 1 - import_IV 4 are 0.505, 0.829,
0.83, and 0.832 respectively. ф UN is UN affinity score. ф Defense =1 when two countries is with defense pack. ф Interaction is 
the measure of political and economic interactions between countries purged from scale effects. 
  
 
Table 2. Linear regression results of the effects of political relation on external tariffs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔS iH,t 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.250) (0.212) (0.328) (0.335) (0.416) (0.567)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-1 ) S ir,t-1 0.096* 0.049* 0.273 0.138 0.048 0.070
(0.097) (0.091) (0.143) (0.142) (0.185) (0.164)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-2 )S ir,t-2 0.385*** 0.201*** 0.527** 0.263** 0.198*** 0.338***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.021) (0.003) (0.000)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-3 )S ir,t-3 0.298*** 0.154*** 0.631*** 0.322*** 0.104*** 0.230***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-4 )S ir,t-4 0.042** 0.021** 0.114* 0.056* 0.004 0.020*
(0.036) (0.035) (0.055) (0.053) (0.296) (0.095)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-5 )S ir,t-5 0.067** 0.034** 0.187** 0.093** 0.003 0.028*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.049) (0.048) (0.122) (0.088)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-6 )S ir,t-6 0.063* 0.032* 0.179* 0.089* 0.010* 0.021
(0.066) (0.065) (0.085) (0.083) (0.067) (0.198)
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.054 0.031 0.116 0.234 0.063 0.095
No. of Obs. 13031 12465 10626 10085 13031 13031
F statistics 17.13 16.75 6.91 8.36 3.31 3.31
The dependent variable is Δτ ij,t in column (1), (5), (6,), and [ σ ij /(σ ij -1)]Δτ ij,t in column (2), and ε ij Δτ ij,t in column (3), and ε ij [σ ij /(σ ij -
1)]Δτ ij,t in column (4). ΔS iH,t is 1-period time difference in the ratio of domestic output to domestic consumption of i . S ir,t is the ratio of
import from partner r to domestic consumption of i at time t . Column (1) - (4) include country-industry fixed effect. Column (5) includes
industry-year fixed effects. Columne (6) includes country-industry and year fixed effects. p-values, based on standard errors clustered at
country-industry level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
 Table 3. Estimation results for the effects of political relation on external tariffs in panel structure. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ф r =1 ф UN,r ф Defense,r ф Interaction,r ф r =1 ф UN,r ф Defense,r ф Interaction,r
ΔS iH,t 0 0 0 0 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.300) (0.303) (0.317) (0.302) (0.537) (0.541) (0.549) (0.538)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-1 ) S ir,t-1 0.137 0.520 0.093*** 0.122 0.070 0.297 0.025 0.060
(0.112) (0.140) (0.000) (0.114) (0.134) (0.114) (0.100) (0.139)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-2 )S ir,t-2 0.289** 0.274** 0.736*** 0.436** 0.338*** 0.478*** 0.890*** 0.427***
(0.011) (0.028) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-3 )S ir,t-3 0.331*** 0.487*** 0.441*** 0.420*** 0.230*** 0.345*** 0.221*** 0.268***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-4 )S ir,t-4 0.056** 0.076** 0.095*** 0.051* 0.020* 0.058 0.007 0.016
(0.037) (0.046) (0.000) (0.067) (0.072) (0.102) (0.464) (0.110)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-5 )S ir,t-5 0.093** 0.138** 0.157*** 0.084* 0.028* 0.068* 0.009 0.022
(0.033) (0.043) (0.000) (0.061) (0.066) (0.060) (0.528) (0.117)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-6 )S ir,t-6 0.088* 0.083 0.172*** 0.080 0.021 0.023 0.007 0.016
(0.062) (0.134) (0.000) (0.107) (0.166) (0.250) (0.676) (0.259)
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistics 9.73 6.25 17.73 11.42 30.26 26.53 33.61 29.53
Rho .49 .49 .49 .49 .14 .14 .13 .14
R 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.051 0.047 0.049
No. of Obs. 10085 10085 10085 10085 13031 13031 13031 13031
The dependent is ε ij [σ ij /(σ ij -1)]Δτ ij,t in column (1) - (4) and Δτ ij,t in column (5) - (8). Column (1) and (5) report estimates not weighted by proxy of political
relation. S iH,t is 1-period time difference in the ratio of domestic output to domestic consumption of i. S ir,t-1 is the ratio of import from partner r to domestic
consumption of i at time t-1 . ф r is the political relation proxy. Estimates in column (2) and (6) are weighted by political affinity scores from UN Assembly Votings.
Estimates in column (3) and (7) are weighted by defense treaty dummy. Estimates in column (4) and (8) are weighted by dyad political interactions. p-values,
based on standard errors clustered at country-industry level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
 Table 4. Estimation results for the effects of on external tariffs using instrument variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Iv 1 Iv 2 Iv 3 Iv 4 Iv 1 Iv 2 Iv 3 Iv 4
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-1 ) S ir,t-1 1.583*** 0.769** 0.645** 0.602** 1.034*** 0.465*** 0.410** 0.397**
(0.000) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.000) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-2 )S ir,t-2 0.534*** 0.288*** 0.258*** 0.237*** 0.479*** 0.474*** 0.462*** 0.457***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-3 )S ir,t-3 0.520*** 0.429*** 0.382*** 0.372*** 0.413*** 0.359*** 0.331*** 0.326***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-4 )S ir,t-4 0.975*** 0.381*** 0.302*** 0.281*** 0.669*** 0.271*** 0.224*** 0.213***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-5 )S ir,t-5 1.218*** 0.485*** 0.396*** 0.393*** 0.162** 0.287*** 0.236*** 0.231***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r (1-τ ir,t-6 )S ir,t-6 0.981*** 0.311*** 0.248*** 0.252*** 0.865*** 0.202*** 0.168*** 0.168***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ΔS iH,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.333) (0.286) (0.289) (0.289) (0.276) (0.218) (0.217) (0.217)
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LM statistic 7.50 9.94 4.33 8.12 15.50 8.07 4.46 6.54
Cragg-donald wald 0.62 64.96 111.49 132.47 9.36 87.59 153.67 194.22
Hansen J. statistics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F-statistics 8.70 9.83 10.2 10.55 16.66 21.67 22.17 20.55
No. of Obs. 9882 9875 9920 9936 12779 12775 12824 12844
The dependent is ε ij [σ ij /(σ ij -1)]Δτ ij,t in column (1) - (4) and Δτ ij,t in column (5) - (8). ΔS iH,t is 1-period time difference in the ratio of domestic output to domestic
consumption of i . S ir,t-1 is the ratio of import from partner r to domestic consumption of i at time t-1 . Column (1) and (4) are instrumented with Iv 1 . Column (2) and
(6) are instrumented with Iv 2 . Column (3) and (7) are instrumented with Iv 3 . Column (4) and (8) are instrumented with Iv 4 . p-values, based on standard errors
clustered at country-industry level, are reported in parentheses. LM statistic reports for underidentification test. Wald F. statistic reports for weak identification test.
Hansen J statistic is zero for the case of exact identification. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
 Table 5. Estimation results for the effects of political relation on external tariffs using instrument variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-1 ) S ir,t-1 2.719*** 2.140*** 1.868*** 1.599*** 0.963*** 0.293*** 0.203*** 0.191*** 2.319*** 0.779** 0.631** 0.579**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.000) (0.033) (0.046) (0.045)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-2 )S ir,t-2 0.486*** 0.348*** 0.320*** 0.308*** 1.100*** 1.104*** 1.092*** 1.121*** 1.105*** 0.438*** 0.401*** 0.357***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-3 )S ir,t-3 0.752*** 0.531*** 0.485*** 0.483*** 2.797** 0.587*** 0.497*** 0.505*** 0.936*** 0.524*** 0.465*** 0.468***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-4 )S ir,t-4 1.039*** 0.723*** 0.618*** 0.531*** 0.990*** 0.362*** 0.237*** 0.222*** 1.134*** 0.398*** 0.308*** 0.287***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-5 )S ir,t-5 1.391*** 0.868*** 0.751*** 0.726*** 1.292*** 0.443*** 0.291*** 0.292*** 1.477*** 0.500*** 0.399*** 0.392***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∑ r ф r (1-τ ir,t-6 )S ir,t-6 1.014*** 0.283*** 0.247*** 0.246*** 0.624*** 0.385*** 0.237*** 0.259*** 1.241*** 0.343*** 0.263*** 0.269***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ΔS iH,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.337) (0.291) (0.293) (0.293) (0.298) (0.318) (0.317) (0.318) (0.346) (0.285) (0.288) (0.288)
Country-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LM statistic 20.65 13.28 2.46 12.9 3.81 2.63 2.63 2.68 6.58 7.52 3.25 5.91
Cragg-Donald Wald 1.86 19.51 2.36 29.84 0.56 54.3 1.72 31.9 0.91 25.03 1.81 26.44
No. of Obs. 9882 9875 9920 9936 9882 9875 9920 9936 9882 9875 9920 9936
ф UN,r ф Defense,r ф Interaction,r
The dependent variable is ε ij [σ ij /(σ ij -1)]Δτ ij,t . ΔS iH,t is 1-period time difference in the ratio of domestic output to domestic consumption of i . S ir,t-1 is the ratio of import from partner r to
domestic consumption of i at time t-1 . Estimates in column (1) - (4) are weighted by political affinity scores from UN Assembly Votings. Estimates in column (5) - (8) are weighted by
defense treaty dummy. Estimates in column (9) - (12) are weighted by dyad political interactions. p-values, based on standard errors clustered at country-industry level, are reported in
parentheses. LM statistic reports for underidentification test. Wald F. statistic reports for weak identification test. Hansen J statistic is zero for the case of exact identification. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
 Figure 1. Change in MFN tariff after formation of PTA for high and low political relation.
  
Figure 2. UN voting similarity scores against frequency of diplomatic interactions
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